L. Training

General Background: Training

The level of performance demonstrated by a fire department is usually a good indication of the type, quantity, and quality of the training provided. HCDFRS has a state-of-the-art training center and a full-time training staff. HCDFRS not only provides continuing in-service training conducted daily by company officers, but also provides scheduled training for officer development and specialty training for drivers, apparatus operators and specialty teams.

The minimum goal of any fire department training program should be to teach each person in the department to operate at acceptable and safe performance levels for his or her rank and assignment. Although national and state consensus standards for firefighter training is certainly taken into account, the specific requisite training for a firefighter is determined by their Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ). In other words, each fire department establishes the qualifications and training one must have to become a fire fighter and are responsible for establishing their own training programs.

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) develops voluntary consensus standards for fire departments. These standards provide guidance, rules, best practices and other items to which fire departments can voluntarily adhere. NFPA establishes standards for training, education, and professional development of personnel within a fire department. NFPA 1561 provides Incident Management System and Command Safety training requirements for responders. [71]

In addition to the NFPA standards, the Maryland Occupational Safety and Health (MOSH) established the Maryland Fire Service Health and Safety Consensus Standard for fire departments within the state. [72] Under the MOSH Consensus Standard, agencies with a duty to respond to an emergency incident, "must provide training and resources to responders commensurate with the duties required at those incidents. (Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 2002)"

Relatedly, the MOSH Consensus Standard also addresses what qualifications or training makes an individual qualified to perform a certain function. Under the standard, pre-emergency responder's training is to be "determined by the AHJ, based on the level of anticipated response. (Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 2002)"

The Consensus Standard for firefighters and fire officers is to be determined by the AHJ (AHJ is provided wide authority). However, for personnel classified as "First Responder, Emergency Medical Technician Basic (EMTB), Emergency Medical Technician Paramedic (EMTP) and Cardiac

[71] NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, STANDARD ON EMERGENCY SERVICES INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND COMMAND SAFETY 1561 (2014).
[72] MD. OCC. SAFETY. AND HEALTH: MARYLAND FIRE SERVICE HEALTH AND SAFETY CONSENSUS STANDARD (MD. DEPT. LABOR, LICENSING, AND REG. 2002).

Rescue Technician (CRT)" the individual must obtain the appropriate license or certification from the Maryland Emergency Medical Services Board (Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 2002). Because both NFPA and MOSH standards are voluntary, Maryland fire departments are provided the flexibility of establishing their own training standards and programs.

Policies and Standards Applicable to Howard County Department of Fire and Rescue Services: Training

HCDFRS Career recruit training is a twenty-six-week, formal program that includes the following: 1) Maryland Emergency Medical Technician – Basic, Emergency Vehicle Operators Course (EVOC), and 2) Firefighter I and II, Hazardous Materials – Operations, and Technical Rescue training courses (i.e. Vehicle and Machinery Extrication, Site Operations, etc.). Included in the syllabus are firefighter survival and rescue training, as well as Incident Command System (ICS) and safety training. Most of this training corresponds directly with the National and State Industry Consensus Training Standards.[73]

Incumbent personnel receive formal and informal training through a variety of sources including but not limited to in- station, multi-company, quarterly officer training, regional, and conference and/or seminar attendance opportunities. Additionally, the HCDFRS holds Battalion level training as needed. In 2017, safety training included a safety stand-down period where the focus was on rapid intervention and MAYDAY situations. (A practical drill was planned however due to budget restraints never implemented).[74] In 2018, Rapid Intervention Crew/MAYDAY training focused on integrating ICS at the Battalion and Company level for firefighter rescue deployment after a MAYDAY declaration during Highrise operations. [75]Additionally, training in Modern Fire Dynamics focused on the complexity of the modern fire environment (i.e. faster fire propagation, unanticipated events, and more rapidly occurring dynamic fire situations) based on recent changes in the construction industry. Recent quarterly officer training held (Feb – March 2018) specifically highlighted Rapid Intervention Crew/MAYDAY (RIC/MAYDAY) and general training in Modern Fire Dynamics.[76]

In the HCDFRS, there are three broad categories of fire rescue service responders. Each of the following groups have different minimum training requirements:

1. career members,
2. county volunteer members (assigned to career staffed stations by the Assistant Chief of the Emergency Services Bureau (ESB)), and
3. corporate volunteer members (members of corporate volunteer fire departments that operate in coordination with HCDFRS administration).

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[73] Howard County Dept. of Fire and Rescue Services, General Order 100.04 Position Requirements- Licenses, Certifications, Experience, and Education (LEADS) Prerequisites (1984).
[74] Howard County Dept. of Fire and Rescue Services, Special Order 2017.23 Safety Stand Down (2017).
[75] Howard County Dept. of Fire and Rescue Services, Special Order Quarterly Officer Training- Winter 2018- RIC/ MAYDAY Training (2018).
[76] Howard County Dept. of Fire and Rescue Services, Special Order 2018.20 Modern Fire Dynamics Training Integration (2018).

Baseline training and experience levels for each career-uniformed position of HCDFRS are detailed in General Order 100.04 Position Requirements. General Order 100.04 Position Requirements officially incorporates the HCDFRS LEAD (Leadership, Education, Assessment, and Development) Program into promotional requirements for career firefighter and officer positions.[77] The program establishes the minimum requirements for each position and provides guidelines for training, education, and experience necessary for advancement within the Department.

Volunteer firefighters and officers are required to meet different training standards. The minimum training standards and qualifications for County Volunteer Firefighters are established in General Order 120.01 County Volunteer Firefighter/EMS Program. [78] Corporate volunteers must meet the minimum requirements set out in General Order 120.03 Operational Standards for Volunteer Personnel[79] and General Order 120.01 Volunteer Officer Requirements[80]

These requirements are described in the tables below:

Fire Fighter Minimum Qualifications

	Career	County Volunteer	Corporate Volunteer
Certificates and Licenses			
Maryland Class C Driver's License (or equivalent)	X		
Maryland Cardiac Rescue Technician/ Maryland Paramedic/ Maryland EMT License or Certification	X	X	X

[77] Howard County Dept. of Fire and Rescue Services, General Order 100.04 Position Requirements-Licenses, Certifications, Experience, and Education Prerequisites (1984).
9 Howard County Dept. of Fire and Rescue Services, General Order 120.01 County Volunteer Firefighter/ EMS Program (1995).
10 Howard County Dept. of Fire and Rescue Services, General Order 120.02 Volunteer Officer Requirements (1995).
11 Howard County Dept. of Fire and Rescue Services, General Order 120.03 Operational Standards for Volunteer Personnel (1997).

	Career	County Volunteer	Corporate Volunteer
Responder to Hazardous Materials/WMD Incidents-Operations Certificate	X		
Vehicle Technical Rescuer I & II Certificate	X	X	
AED Certification			X
First Responder			X
HCDFRS Courses			
Structural Collapse Awareness Seminar	X		
Swift Water Rescue Awareness seminar	X	X	
Trench Rescue Awareness Seminar	X	X	
Training Academy Physical Fitness	X		
Active Assailant—Warm Zone Ops (Initial)	X		
Wellness, Nutrition, Fitness (starting 1/1/19)	X		
Infectious Control		X	
MFRI Courses			
Firefighter I	X	X	X
Firefighter II	X		
Hazardous Materials Operations	X	X	
Rescue Technician: Site Operations	X		
Rescue Technician: Vehicle and Machinery Extrication	X		
Rescue Technician, Confined Space	X		
Emergency Vehicle Driver Operator	X		
Courage to be Safe	X	X	
Firefighter Survival and Rescue	X	X	
Active Assailant Awareness	X		
Weapons of Mass Destruction		X	
Thumper			X
FEMA Courses			
IS 100.b Introduction to Incident Command System (ICS)	X	X	

	Career	County Volunteer	Corporate Volunteer
IS 200.b ICS Single Resource and Initial Action Incidents	X	X	
IS 700.a National Incident Management System (NIMS)	X	X	
IS 800.b National Response Framework		X	

Lieutenant Minimum Qualifications

	Career	Corporate Volunteer
Pre-Requisites		
All Firefighter rank requirements	X	X
Age		21+ years old
Experience	4 years as HCDFRS Firefighter OR 3 years as HCDFRS Firefighter and Operational Paramedic	3 years operational fire service experience above minimum operational standards and 1 year service in Howard County
Education	HS Diploma AND 3 semesters of college credits (at least 39 credits)	
Certificates and Licenses		
Incident Safety Officer – Fire Suppression	X	X
Incident Safety Officer – Technical Rescue	X	
Fire Apparatus Driver Operator – Pumps	X	
Fire Service Instructor I	X	
Fire Officer I	X	X
EMS Officer I	X	
Fire Inspector I	X	
Vehicle Technical Rescuer I & II		X
Maryland EMT Certification or higher		X
MFRI Courses		
IS 300 Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents for Operational First Responders	X	
Aerial Apparatus Driver Operator	X	
Leadership in Supervision: Creating Environments for Professional Growth	X	
FEMA Courses		
Principles of Building Construction	X	
IS 800.b National Response Framework	X	

Captain Minimum Qualifications

	Career	Corporate Volunteer
Pre-Requisites		
Age		21+ years old
Experience	2 years as HCDFRS Firefighter Lieutenant OR 1 year as HCDFRS Fire Lieutenant + Bachelor's Degree	5 years operational fire service experience AND 2+ years volunteer services with Howard County
Education	HS diploma + 3 semesters of college (at least 45 credits)	
Certificates and Licenses		
Health and Safety Officer	X	
Fire Service Instructor II	X	
Fire Officer II	X	X
MFRI Courses		
Decision Making for Initial Company Operations	X	
Preparation for Initial Company Operations	X	
Strategy and Tactics for Initial Company Operations	X	
Leadership in Supervision: Perspectives in Thinking	X	
FEMA Courses		
IS 400 Advanced ICS for Command and General Staff, Complex Incidents, and MACS	X	
IS 702.a NIMS Public Information Systems	X	
IS 703.a NIMS Resource Management	X	
Principles of Building Construction	X	

Battalion Chief Minimum Qualifications (HCDFRS Career Only)

	Career
Pre-Requisites	
Age	
Experience	2 years as HCDFRS Fire Captain OR 1 year as HCDFRS Fire Captain AND a Master's Degree
Education	75 semester-based credits
Certificates and Licenses	
Fire Officer III	X
MFRI Courses	
Leadership in Supervision: Frameworks for Success	X

Assistant Chief Qualifications

	Career	Corporate Volunteer
Pre-Requisites		
Age		24+ years old
Experience	5 years as HCDFRS Fire Captain and/or HCDFRS Battalion Chief; OR 4 years as HDCFRS Captain and /or HCDFRS Battalion Chief AND a master's degree	8 years or more operational fire experience, 4 years in Howard County, AND 1 year as a Volunteer Officer in Howard County
Education	105 semester-based college credits	
Certificates and Licenses		
Fire Officer III		X
Fire Officer IV	X	

Findings and Recommendations: Training

The HCDFRS has an extensive training program, as outlined in General Order 100.04 Position Requirements in the Leadership, Education, Assessment, and Development (LEAD) Program.[81] Despite this extensive program, the actions of HCDFRS personnel during this incident indicate that current training and leadership programs have been inadequate in fostering the necessary skills for practical application. This conclusion comes from a variety of factors, including the extensive experience of personnel on the fireground, verifying personnel training records, and a review of the incident for what contributed to FF Flynn's death.

During the incident, HCDFRS personnel met the minimum training standards for their rank. Although crewmembers on the scene prior to the sudden hazardous event had an average of 15.7 years of HCDFRS experience, errors were made. Most of these errors occurred from the loss of situation awareness that affected the application of sound tactical decisions.[82] This was especially apparent between the different units working on the fireground. These tactical errors contributed to Engines 51 and 101 entering a structure on the level above a working basement fire. Many of these errors could have been mitigated or prevented if more training had been conducted in a realistic environment on a continuous basis to assist with learning the concept of situation awareness and its impact in Rapid Decision Making.[83]

First, although all HCFRS personnel train on the Incident Command System (ICS) neither the current General Orders nor the current training program establish a clear philosophy of Incident Command for divisions, groups and unit operations.[84] There are two philosophies for Incident Command to convey strategy and tactics to personnel operating on the fireground: Befehlstaktik (order-based tactics) and Auftragstatik (mission-based tactics). Befehlstaktik is a centralized command and control structure in which the command chain prescribes why, when, and how operations will be conducted. For example, some HCDFRS officers are trained in the Blue Card method which employs order-based tactic philosophy. Auftragstaktik is less regimented, with the Incident Commander providing instruction on the why and when of operations (commander's intent) but delegates how operations are executed to lower level leaders. This command philosophy is often employed by the Marine Corps, however HCDFRS officers do not receive explicit training in this command philosophy. Both command philosophies are woven

[81] Howard County Dept. of Fire and Rescue Services, General Order 100.04 Position Requirements-Licenses, Certifications, Experience, and Education Prerequisites (1984).

[82] Mica R. Endsley, D. G. (2012). Designing for Situational Awareness: An Approach to User-Centered Design. Boca Raton: CRC Press.

[83] Gary A. Klein, R. C.-C. (1988). Rapid Decision Making on the Fire Ground. Alexandria: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

[84] Krulak, G. C. (1996). Fleet Marine Force Manual 6 Command and Control. Washington: Headquarters United States Marine Corps.

throughout HCDFRS General Orders and neither are explicitly supported by department training. This results in confusion among HCDFRS personnel, hindering team cohesion.

A strong example of HCDFRS' mixed command philosophy is HCDFRS General Order 300.07, Incident Command System, which outlines three Modes of Command: Investigation, Tactical, and Strategic. Investigation Command Mode is typically conducted by the first arriving company officer or firefighter, with the goal of conducting the incident size-up and investigating any unidentified hazard. Tactical Command Mode occurs when "a company officer that is performing all the responsibilities of Command while on-foot and from within the tactical environment."[85] Despite operating within the tactical environment, but outside of an IDLH environment, the Incident Commander in Tactical Command Mode is expected to conduct all Command responsibilities, including establishing incident objectives, overall incident strategy, evaluating the need for additional resources, and directing and assigning responding resources. Lastly, Strategic Command Mode involves the Incident Commander establishing a Command Post within an environment that facilitates and enhances Command functions, but outside of the tactical environment (typically from within a designated command vehicle).

From the three Command Modes established in General Order 300.07, Incident Command, none establish a clear command philosophy. Investigation Command, functionally describes sensemaking of a potential incident scene with a notional decision maker on site. It does not provide any clear philosophy of either order based or mission-based tactics, presumably allowing the Investigation Incident Commander to use their personal command philosophy. Although this may empower individual commanders, responding units will need to have a pre-existing relationship with the commander to know whether they are expected to operate in a mission-based or order-based environment. Even more confusing are the Tactical Command Mode and Strategic Command Mode, which requires the Incident Commander to establish the overall incident strategy, establish objectives, evaluate the need for additional resources, as well as direct and assign responding resources upon arrival. These requirements blend both command philosophies, having the Incident Commander establish the strategy and objectives (mission-based) as well as directly manage assets and resources (order-based). The notable difference between Tactical Command and Strategic Command is the location of the commander (within the Hazard Zone or outside the Hazard Zone), which changes the environment of the incident commander but provides no guidance on command philosophy for the department.

Without clear command philosophy within the department, it is impossible to provide the adequate training necessary for HCDFRS personnel to cohere as a firefighting force optimally on the fireground. Currently, HCDFRS permits each Incident Commander to employ various command philosophies established by the Department, which results in inconsistent expectations for arriving units dependent solely on which officer establishes command.

Additionally, the command philosophy employed during an incident can change mid-incident either by the passing of Command to another officer or because the Incident Commander changes how they interact with crews on the Fireground. For example, during the 7005 Woodscape Drive Incident, the Incident Commander provided commands under both command philosophies. The Incident Commander's method to establish water supply employed the order-based philosophy while the commander's establishment of Fire Attack employed a mission-based philosophy. HCDFRS officers seldom receive adequate practical training in establishing Incident Command philosophies for typical structure fire incidents, in addition to rapid decision-making training with application in realistic conditions.

Determining and reinforcing a department-wide command philosophy and implementing regular and realistic rapid decision-making training will set the necessary foundation for all department operations to prevent future issues. As described in the Strategy and Tactics section, a mission-oriented command philosophy will best serve fireground operations. This command philosophy "encourages individual initiative, skill, and creativity" of lower-ranked personnel (group supervisors, groups and units) while still providing the Incident Commander command and control over the incident management strategy.[86]

Second, the current HCDFRS training program is primarily focused on personnel classroom course hours (didactic) rather than a representation of the practical skills they have acquired for their position. While the training material covered in the current LEADS document and standards is undisputedly valuable, the department does not verify that personnel can apply the material learned in courses to their position (with the exception of the paramedic specialization). Additionally, the LEADS document establishes the required training courses for officers but has not developed officer core competencies. For example, the LEADS document identifies mentorship as a core skill officers should employ, but there is no competency-based mentorship. Without this verification of fundamental practical skills, or continuing certification of basic practical skills, it is unclear whether all personnel maintain a baseline readiness for a true response.

For example, during the 7005 Woodscape Drive incident crews entered the residential structure on the level above a working fire despite acknowledging situational cues and patterns that indicate a basement fire. To address this, HCDFRS should reform its continuing training and exercise program to incorporate drills and exercises that demonstrate that all personnel possess and maintain core practical competencies for fire and rescue operations. This would include fireground Situation Awareness, Pattern Recognition and Rapid Decision Making. [87]

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[86] Krulak, G. C. (1996). Fleet Marine Force Manual 6 Command and Control. Washington: Headquarters United States Marine Corps.

[87] Mica R. Endsley, D. G. (2012). Designing for Situational Awareness: An Approach to User-Centered Design. Boca Raton: CRC Press and Gary A. Klein, R. C.-C. (1988). Rapid Decision Making on the Fire Ground. Alexandria: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Third, drills and training exercises should occur in realistic conditions. During an active fire, personnel within the hazard area often must operate under arduous conditions (stress, friction, uncertainty and ambiguity)[88] that will likely impact the decisions, tasks, and situational awareness of fireground personnel. By simulating core actions in as realistic of an environment as possible, personnel will be better prepared to respond to real-life incidents.

Fourth, HCDFRS personnel are highly trained in RIC and MAYDAY procedures. While these procedures are undeniably important, there is little practical training on error prevention and error trapping to prevent a MAYDAY situation from occurring.[89] Although error prevention is best, error trapping can avoid a negative outcome after an error is made. Error trapping is when an error is quickly recognized and actions are taken to mitigate or remove the error before a negative outcome occurs. For example, at the 7005 Woodscape Drive Incident Engine 51 and Tower 10 entered into the structure on the first floor and observed indications of a possible basement fire. After noticing those conditions, they exited the structure—effectively trapping their error. Training developed for firefighters should incorporate scenarios based on error prevention and error trapping before error mitigation practices come in to play such as a MAYDAY. Firefighter(s) can better utilize these practices by understanding Safety Red Flags such as zero visibility, encountering high heat, reports of "we can't find the fire," and so forth.

Fifth, in reviewing communications and actions on the Fireground, the ISRB identified several critical instances where actions were taken but not communicated with Command or among other crew members. Also, different forms of communications terminology were used which may have led to an erroneous mental model. For example, During the early stages of fire communications between the Incident Commander and members operating in the Fire Attack Group there was confusion. One possible reason for this is that crew members did not use the multi-story numbering convention outlined in HCDFRS General Order 300.07: Incident Command Systems.[90] Instead, there were different terms used to describe similar areas of the structure, referencing "basement," "ground level," "first level," "floor number one" and "lower section" all within the first 28 minutes of the incident to communicate geographical information to the Incident Commander. This lack of common terminology created a misunderstanding between operating crews and the Incident Commander which contributed to an erroneous mental model. HCDFRS should incorporate the multi-story numbering convention from HCDFRS General Order 300.07 Incident Command Systems into a hands-on training simulation, ideally one that practices an incident size-up.

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[88] Gray, G. A. (1997). Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 Warfighting. Washington: Headquarters United States Marine Corps.

[89] Helmreich RL, Klinect JR, Wilhelm JA. Proceedings of the tenth international symposium on aviation psychology. Columbus: Ohio State University; 1999. Models of threat, error, and CRM in flight operations; pp. 677–682.

[90] Howard County Dept. of Fire and Rescue Services, General Order 300.07 Incident Command System (2005).

Sixth, although many HCDFRS members have been trained on the Blue Card communication method, which uses the communications order model, personnel on the fireground did not effectively implement the communications order model. During the 7005 Woodscape Drive incident crews left communications loops open and not closed as required in the model. For example, Incident Command asked Engine 101A to clarify to which quadrant her crew was deploying. Before Engine 101A was able to respond to that request, Tower 10A interjected with additional information before Engine 101A's communication loop was closed. By failing to close the communication loop, it remained unclear whether the communication was effectively received or correctly interpreted. HCDFRS should employ department-wide, practical hands-on training on closed-loop communication and HCDFRS officers should ensure that closed-loop communication is used consistently in the field.[91]

Seventh, HCDFRS has deployed equipment into the field without adequate training on the equipment. For example, the department training prior to the deployment of the Motorola APX8000XE portable radio was provided on a department e-mail slideshow of how to operate the radio but fell short of any "hands-on" practice. The Motorola APX8000XE portable radio is a complex piece of life safety equipment, requiring specific training to operate appropriately that can only be effectively achieved through "hands-on" practice. Similarly, HCDFRS deployed new Thermal Imaging Cameras into the field the same week as the 7005 Woodscape Drive incident and did not provide any prior hands-on training. Before any future equipment field deployment, HCDFRS must facilitate hands-on, competency-based training in realistic scenarios for all personnel on the equipment.

Eighth, after a review of the HCDFRS training General Orders the ISRB recognized a discrepancy between the minimum training requirements for Career HCDFRS and Corporate Volunteer officers. As a combination department, a Corporate Volunteer has the same duties and expectations as HCDFRS Career personnel. Because the positions are treated equally in the field, all personnel of the same rank should have the same minimum training to assure consistency and team cohesion.

Findings	**Recommendations**
L.1 Although all HCFRS personnel train on the Incident Command System (ICS) neither the current General Orders nor the current training program establish a clear philosophy of Incident Command for divisions, groups and unit operations.	L.1.1 HCDFRS policies and training for the ICS must emphasize a mission-oriented philosophy of command.

[91] Department of Homeland Security Administration, U. F. (2016). Voice Radio Communications Guide for the Fire Service. Washington: U.S..

Findings	Recommendations
L.2 Current HCDFRS training rarely provides realistic, practical, hands-on scenarios for personnel to master fireground fundamentals. Particularly noteworthy in this incident was the inability for fireground personnel to properly identify situational cues that there was an active basement fire. This aspect alone should have indicated that entry on the first floor was unsafe and caused personnel to alter their tactics for fire attack.	L.2.1 HCDFRS training must be conducted in realistic practical environments that contain the elements of stress and friction. L.2.2 HCDFRS must develop a competency-based mentorship and training program to address effective rapid decision making and situational awareness on the fireground. Said program should include evaluative mechanisms for measuring an officer's core skills of proficiency for their position.
L.3 HCDFRS personnel are trained in MAYDAY and RIC protocols and best practices.	L.3.1 HCDFRS must implement practical, realistic training on preventing and trapping errors on the fireground.
L.4 HCDFRS MAYDAY training does not incorporate error prevention or error trapping on the fireground.	See Recommendation L.3.1
L.5 Although many HCDFRS members have been trained on the Blue Card communication method, which uses the communications order model, personnel on the fireground did not effectively implement the communications order model.	L.5.1 HCDFRS needs to define the terminology conventions for geographic locations used on the fire scene. Training needs to include the terminology as well as practicing the proper functions in the communications order model.
L.6 HCDFRS has deployed equipment into the field without adequate training on the equipment (Thermal Imagine Cameras and Motorola APX8000XE portable radios).	L.6.1 Before any future equipment field deployment, HCDFRS must facilitate hands-on, competency-based training in realistic scenarios for all personnel on the equipment. L.6.2 HCDFRS needs to develop a training program that incorporates NFPA 1408, Standard for Training Fire Service Personnel in the Operation, Care, Use, and Maintenance of Thermal Imagers.
L.7 After a review of the HCDFRS training General Orders the ISRB recognized a discrepancy between the minimum training requirements for Career	L.7.1 All HCDFRS personnel, career and corporate volunteer, of the same rank should have the same minimum training

Findings	Recommendations
HCDFRS and Corporate Volunteer officers.	to assure consistency and team cohesion.